SPECIESISM

However, it is hard to find in this marginal
humans way of dealing with speciesism a clear
clear
tie to what animal
animal advocates deplore as
prejudice against
against animals. I doubt that these
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advocates
would
feel
a
sense
of
accomplishment and celebrate the defeat of
speciesism if marginal humans came to be
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treated as tools for research in just the way
animals currently are. Seeking consistency in
our treatment of animals and marginal humans

As in her many other papers on animal
rights, Professor Pluhar here presents us with
a very careful and thorough analysis and
I think that her criticisms of the
critique.
defenses of speciesism offered by Michael

does not seem to be what the animal rights
movement is about. When earlier this year R.
G. Frey acknowledged to an audience of animal

Wreen, Michael A. Fox, and Thomas Young are
well-taken, and although devil's advocates are
a traditional part of the entertainment at

rights advocates in San Francisco that he
knows of no compelling reason why marginal
humans should not be vivisected as readily as
animals, he was not warmly applauded as
someone who had at last been the light and
overcome his speciesist bIas.
bias.
Rather, the
response of the audience was that this
philosophical talk of "speciesism" was an
abstract, intellectual game in which the real

philosophical conferences, I really don't want
to spend my time Sophistically trying to defend
these defenders of speciesism against her very
formidable barrage. Rather, I would like to
offer a few comments about the general
framework in which the debate over
speciesism has developed over the past few
Primarily, I want to talk about the
years.
nature and moral significance of speciesism
and about the relevance or irrelevance of our
treatment of so-called "marginal humans" to
speciesism.

issues of prejudice against animals were lost.
Hopefully, I will not be considered a traitor
to my profession if I say that I agree with the
untutored on this one. I don't think that how
we treat marginal humans is the or even a
crucial case for determining what speciesism
is or whether it is a prejudice or a justified
so
preference. And while I think that the socalled "argument from marginal cases"--
cases"--roughly, "Why is it okay to vivisect a dog but
not a severely retarded orphan?"---is an
excellent rhetorical device, a dramatic way of
catching people up short and getting them to
think about animal ethics issues when they
have not thought much about them before, I do
not believe it is more than that. As I have
explained elsewhere, it is ultimately neither a
particularly convincing argument nor one that
provides insight into why we treat animals as

Evelyn begins by giving
giVing us two clear,
precise definitions of "speciesism," one dealing
with preferential treatment, the other with
rights.
She then proceeds to explain how
speciesism can be considered a form of
bigotry, in a clash with racism and sexism:
there is as large a gap between the mental
capacities of normal human adults and severely
mentally impaired humans as there is between
those normal humans and nonhuman animals,
but speciesism nonetheiess gathers these
marginal humans into the moral fold while
leaving the animals out in the cold. Evelyn then
devotes the main body of her paper to

we do. [1]

criticizing various attempts to justify treating
these marginal humans differently than
animals. She thus discusses species
ism by
speciesism
following the pattern of argument about
marginal humans which has developed over the
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past
past few years and. makes a sound contribution
to that_ mini-tradition.
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BEI'WEEN THE SPECIE'S
SPECIES

chapter. [2] There is no mention of marginal
humans at all. Rather, the discussion is about
sexism and racism, contains quotations from
Thomas Jefferson and Sojourner Truth about
the moral insignificance of superior intellect
among normal humans, and concludes with a
discussion of Bentham's famous claim that
"The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can
they talk? but, Can they suffer?" The crucial
points Singer makes here are that "the
capacity to suffer is the only defensible
boundary of concern for the interests of

To appreciate the irrelevance of marginal
humans to the question of whether speciesism
is a prejudice, consider the cases of sexism
and racism, to which Evelyn, like so many
animal rights advocates, compares speciesism.
Evelyn contends that speciesism is a prejudice
like sexism and racism because they all lead to
treating similar cases differently. In the case
of speciesism, the similar cases are those
animals which are as intelligent as marginal
humans.
However, when people point to
sexism and racism as prejudices, it is not
because there are some women and blacks who
are as intelligent as defective men and whites

others" and that sexism,
speciesism are identical in
principle of equality by giving
to the interests of members
groups when there is a class of

but are not being given rights or other
considerations equal to those of the defective
men and whites. Even suggesting that this is
the sort of prejudice involved in sexism and
racism would be considered insulting to
women
and blacks---and, I may add, it is

Thus,
analysis

Singer's analysis of speciesism locates the
prejudice of it in the use of intelligence as the
criterion of moral considerability. He contends

severely incompetent humans, humans who are

that the capacity for sufferi ng is the proper
criterion.
On the other hand, focusing on
marginal humans when defining the prima facie

so defective they must be institutionalized.
The charge of prejudice in sexism and
racism has to do with typical, standard,

bigotry of speciesism early in her paper leads
Pluhar (for the purposes of this argument) to
accept intelligence as the criterion for moral
considerability and to locate the fault in the
different treatment accorded marginal humans
and animals which equally meet that criterion.

ordinarily women and blacks

are as intelligent, sensitive, and otherwise
deserving of respect as are men and whites;
so, routinely to treat them as second-class
citizens is morally unjustified---if, as we
commonly do today, we start with some kind
of egalitarian presumption. If one cannot make

And this is a "fault" not because animals should
not be treated as poorly as we treat them but
only because---perhaps due to our irrational,
instinctual, sentimental attachment to our
fellow humans---we resist treating marginal
humans as we treat animals and thereby
violate
some
presumed,
overriding

a similar case regarding speciesism, i. e., that
animals typically meet relevant moral criteria
in the same way humans typically do, then
there is a fundamental disanalogy between
speciesism and sexism or racism. No amount
of fancy footwork regarding marginal humans

commandment to be consistent.
Since the
shoddiness of our treatment of animals thus
does not figure directly in this sort of analysis
of and argument about the prejudice of
speciesism, it is no wonder that this debate
over our treatment of marginal humans seems

will change that.
The way the term "speciesism" entered the
animal rights debate also suggests that our
treatment of marginal humans is not where the
action is. Although Richard Ryder coined the

to many animal advocates to be so remote
from their concerns.

term "speciesism," it was made famous by
Peter Singer in Animal Liberation, where it is
introduced in the early pages of the first
BE'IWEEN THE SPECIES

Singer provides a very different
of the prejudice involved in

speciesism than the one Pluhar has given us.

similarly insulting, even paradoxical, to
attempt to enhance the moral status of animals
by drawing analogies between them and

normal cases:

racism, and
violating the
greater weight
of their own
interests.

Returning to Singer, on his analysis the
98
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See "Moral Community and Animal
Rights," American Philosophical Quarterly 17
(1980), pp. 45-52, or Morals Reson and
Animals (Philadelphia:
Temple University
Press, 1987), Chapter 8.
2.
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Avon Books, 1975), pp. 6-
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ONTHE
RELEVANCE
OF MARGINAL
HUMANS:
A Repry To
Sapontzis

If we start by presuming that the interests
of others should not (prima facie) be
disregarded, then the burden of proof is
clearly on those who maintain a speciesist
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Notes

a speciesist doctrine is one which gives
such great moral importance to what typically
distinguishes one species from others that it
leads to disregarding the interests of those
others in favor of satisfying the interests of
members of the favored species.

prejudice.

:rt:-M

treatment of marginal humans, I agree with
Evelyn that speciesism is a prejudice.

prejudice of speciesism lies not in the fact that
marginal humans are treated better than
animals but in valuing typically superior human
intelligence so highly that the interests and
suffering of animals are considered morally
insignificant in comparison to those of humans,
which is to say normal humans.
He thus
focuses on the issue of animal suffering, which
is the motivating concern of animal advocates,
and the moral insignificance of animals'
supposedly inferior intelligence as an excuse
for not taking their SUffering
suffering seriously. This
analysis suggests characterizing speciesism in
a rather different way than either of the two
definitions Evelyn has given us.
Such a
characterization might run as follows:

doctrine to demonstrate why

>-~

it is not a

And I think that in contemporary,
society

we

do

start

with

Evelyn Pluhar

that

presumption, since the idea that animals should
I couldn't agree more with Professor
Sapontzis' contention that the root of human
willingness to sacrifice nonhuman animals is
the assumption that our "superior" mental
abilities license the exploitation of so-called
The - "untutored" view is
"lesser" beings.
The>
shared by mainstream ethical theorists, who
hold that autonomous moral agents ('persons'
in the strictest sense of that term) are the
primary possessors of basic moral rights. I
pointed this out ~t the beginning of this paper,

not be treated cruelly is a commonplace today,
the controversy thus being not over whether
animals are morally considerable at ail but
more specifically over what sorts or degrees
of moral status they have and what sorts or
degrees of moral responsibility or obligation
we have to them. It follows that the question
of whether speciesism is a prejudice covers a
whole range of questions:
does our
characteristically superior intelligence justify
our routinely killing animals for entertainment
or meat, justify our routinely imprisoning
them for amusement or profit, justify our
routinely making them sick to cure our ills, and
so forth.
I think that the answer to those
questions is "No," which is why, no matter
what one concludes about our preferential
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